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Abstract
Increasing divisional operational responsibilities and the dispersal of knowledge creating
activities within the firm have loosened the traditional hierarchical structure of
multi−divisional firms. In this paper we argue that a similar mixture of competition and
cooperation that is found in inter−firm relationships now characterizes intra−firm
relationships. Our model describes a situation in which divisional managers have their own
objectives that may diverge from those of the firm as a whole.Thus, divisional managers are
both profit−seekers in creating value that can be appropriated and rent−seekers in attempting
to maximize their divisional share of the value created by the firm. The bargaining power of a
division to maintain and increase its share of the profits generated by the operations of the
firm as whole is crucially determined on its strategic independence.
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Divisions in multi-divisional corporations differ in terms of productivity.  Advocates of the 
resource-based view of business organizations suggest that division performance varies due to 
different strategic resources owned by each division (Wernerfelt, 1984).  More specifically, they 
argue that different divisional strategic advantages in the form of valuable, rare and inimitable 
resources produce differences in the ability of divisions to generate returns for the firm as a whole 
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).  
In this paper we construct a theoretical model to describe how the profits generated by 
divisional resource-based advantages are distributed amongst divisions within the firm.  However, 
the concept of resource distribution in the context of strategic competitive advantage is closely 
related to rent appropriation (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993).  Therefore, our aim in this paper is to 
formulate a theory to illustrate the process whereby resources flow within multi-divisional firms.  
We show that divisional bargaining power is a crucial determinant of rent appropriation (Coff, 
1999). 
We construct a model in which divisions have their own goals that may diverge from those of 
the firm as a whole.  We hypothesize that division managers are both profit seeking and rent-
seeking since their actions take place with two different objectives in mind.  The first objective, that 
can be termed ‘external’, is maximizing shareholders’ value through market operations aimed at 
maximizing profits.  The second objective is ‘internal’ and comes about when profits earned on the 
market become rents available for transfer within the firm. We argue that managers bargain with 
each other in the attempt to secure the highest amount of available rents for their divisions.  
Divisional power within the firm is the prime determinant of the distribution of these rents. 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) develop a similar model of inefficient allocation of resources due 
to intra-firm managerial behavior.  In their model, divisional managers split their time between non-
productive (lobbying for resources) and productive (using the resources to run their divisions) 
activities.  They show that managers of less productive divisions spend a higher proportion of their 
time on lobbying for resources.  Our model differs from theirs in a fundamental way.  They assume 
an all-powerful headquarters that can allocate firm resources by fiat
1 and that a division’s 
bargaining power is based simply on its lobbying efforts.  In contrast, we assume that headquarters 
(and top management) may not exercise complete control over divisional management.  In other 
words, we allow for the possibility that divisional managers may be so powerful as to be beyond the 
control of headquarters,
2  Such managers can act in a persistent manner, to further the interests of 
their divisions even at the expense of the prospects of the firm as a whole.  Thus, no matter what the 
level of lobbying effort undertaken by other divisions, headquarters is unable to extract resources 
from powerful divisions.  Further, powerful divisions are able to extract transfers from weaker 
divisions – they do not need to lobby headquarters to do so.  This also contrasts with the assumption 
of Scharfstein and Stein (2000).   
Profits generated by the firm are distributed between divisions through a process of 
negotiations.  These profits become internal rents and are the payoff of the bargaining game.  In a 
simple constant sum bargaining game all the gains of one player are the losses of another.  In such a 
simplified model managers are only rent-seekers without taking into account any production and/or 
market considerations.  Since the payoff is simply a share of a constant block of rents, each division 
aims at obtaining as large a share as possible.  However, our aim in this study is to develop a more 
sophisticated model in which production considerations come into the picture.  When we introduce 
production considerations, the activities to maximize the division’s share of firm profits are 
                                                 
1 This assumption of a dictatorial headquarters is consistent in the internal capital markets literature.  In one of the 
seminal papers in this area, Stein (1997) assumes that ‘Headquarters’ control rights also give it the authority to 
redistribute resources across projects’ (p.117).  
2 For example, Bartlett (2002) provides a detailed description of Philips’ corporate headquarters inability to control its 
huge North American subsidiary.    2
tempered by considerations about the potentially harmful effects of these activities on the overall 
level of these profits. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
We focus on the divisions in a given firm, and for notational simplicity restrict our attention to the 
case of two divisions, denoted by A and B.  The results, however, extend directly to the case of an 
arbitrary number of divisions.  Each division has a primary responsibility, e.g., a geographical 
territory, a product category, a business function, etc.  However, both divisions, to greater or lesser 
extent, have secondary responsibilities to support the primary division.  For pedagogical ease, let us 
focus on the case of geographical markets. 
The payoff of a typical division ‘i’ emanates from serving the firm (increasing firm sales) as 
well as from serving its own interests (increasing divisional power within the firm).  These payoffs 
appear sequentially.  Firstly, the division must generate sales and profits.  These profits are the 
source of divisible rents.  Secondly, the division must bargain with the other division to determine 
its share of the total rents.  Thus, the game is organized in two stages where the two divisions are 
create profits in competition with other firms in the first stage and divide profits between 
themselves in the second stage.  Before starting the analytical part of the section and therefore 
solving the game, it is important to make a note of two considerations. 
First, from the perspective of the firm, divisional profit seeking is beneficial while rent 
seeking is detrimental.  Profit seeking strengthens the firm’s competitive position in the market.  
However, rent seeking merely involves pursuing transfers from other divisions and/or preventing 
transfers to other divisions.  Such activities do not benefit the firm as a whole.  As it is well known, 
rent seeking leads to a misallocation of resources and thus to inefficiency (Tullock, 1967). In this 
context, the question that arises is why headquarters, acting as the principal, cannot set up 
incentives to ensure that rent seeking activities by the divisions (the agents) are reduced to a 
minimum.  The conditions under which it is possible to write an optimal contract that will induce an 
agent to desist from undertaking actions deleterious to the principal are well established in the 
literature (Laffont and Martimort, 2002).  The lower the level of observability of the agent’s actions, 
the higher the (expected) cost of the optimal contract to the principal.  Since the tight monitoring of 
the multitude of details involved in running a division in a large multi-divisional corporation is 
virtually impossible, we posit that preventing divisional rent seeking cannot be done by contractual 
design. 
Second, a unique aspect of the principal-agent game played by headquarters and divisional 
management relates to the nature of the latter’s availability of outside options.  While divisions can 
act in their own interests, sometimes at the expense of the firm as whole, the option of exiting the 
firm is generally unavailable to them.  Paradoxically, even to achieve autarky within the firm, a 
division must have power.  A weak division will be exploited and unable to prevent its resources 
being appropriated by more powerful divisions and/or by headquarters.  Therefore autarky is not an 
outside option and divisions are ipso facto, engaged with headquarters and with each other.  We can 
now move on and solve the game backward in the standard manner. 
In the second stage of the game, the two divisions bargain over sharing the profits that have 
been generated in the first stage.  Total firm profit is therefore a pre-determined variable in the 
second stage.  We denote the total profits generated in the first stage by Π and the payoff of the 
divisions A and B by PA and PB.  The ‘adding up’ constraint is PA+PB = Π.  Then the Nash 
bargaining solution is obtained by maximizing (PA)
α(Π -PA)
(1-α) with respect to PA.  In this 
formulation, α is the bargaining power of division A and (1-α) is the bargaining power of division 
B.  The levels of these bargaining powers will be determined in the first stage and are also pre-
determined in the second stage.  This yields the standard Nash bargaining solution as 
 
PA / PB  = α / (1-α),  
   3
so that utilizing the ‘adding up’ constraint, we may write the Nash bargaining solution as: 
 
(1a)  PA
* = α Π 
(1b)  PB
* = (1-α) Π 
 
In the first stage the divisions use their resources to generate profits.  Again, for notational 
simplicity, we map the resource bundle of each division into scalar-valued indicator variables, EA
0 
and EB
0.  Total profits of the firm are the sum of the profits generated by division A and division B.  
(In general, divisional profits will be different from divisional pay-offs due to inter-divisional 
transfers.)  Thus, 
 




Each division can use its resource bundle in two ways – in its own operations or in the support of 
the activities of the other division.  Incorporating the divisional resource constraints, the profits of 
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Finally, we assume that the bargaining power of each division is a function of its profit share.  For 
example, the bargaining power of division A is α  = f (Π
A / Π). Agglomerating this information and 
substituting it into the Nash bargaining solution to the second stage game, division A wishes to 
select its resource use to maximize: 
 
(3)  PA
* = α Π = f (Π
A / Π) {Π
A(EA, EB
0 – EB) + Π
B(EB, EA
0 – EA)} 
 
The maximization problem of division B is symmetric. The first order condition for maximum may 
be written as 
 
(4)  ∂PA










2 ] = 0 
 
It may be demonstrated that, for well-behaved profit functions, the second order conditions for 
maximum are satisfied.  Examining equation (4), we can relate optimal behavior of the division to 
the nature of the bargaining power function f(.). 
Exogenously Determined Divisional Power 




2 = 0. 
Examining (2), it may be seen that this is precisely the condition required for division A’s actions to 
maximize overall firm profit, i.e., it uses its resources optimally from the perspective of the firm as 
a whole.  In this case, divisional outcomes have no impact on divisional bargaining power.  
Bargaining power is then exogenous to the profit generation in stage 1. 
Several situations are compatible with this case.  First, it can represent the traditional 
hierarchical case where headquarters is extremely powerful and divisional power is extremely 
limited.  Thus, divisions are unable to generate leverage through their actions.  Second, it can 
represent the situation of an extremely weak division.  For example, a division may be so small that 
increases in its results may have a negligible impact on the firm’s bottom line and so yield very 
little leverage.  The result is therefore quite intuitive – when headquarters is all-powerful or when a 
division is very weak, optimal divisional actions maximize the firm’s prospects.  In other words, the 
firm-focused objective pre-dominates and the division-focused objective disappears. 
Thirdly, exogenously determined bargaining power can also be interpreted as the case where 
headquarters is able to design incentive contracts to motivate divisional managers to act in the   4
interests of the firm as a whole.  An example would be payment schemes linked to firm-level 
performance. 
Endogenously Determined Divisional Power 
A natural expectation of the function f (.) is that f ′ > 0.  In this case, for (4) to hold, for 







2 < 0 
 
The marginal value of resource use in division A’s own activities is smaller than the marginal value 
in the other division’s activities.  In other words, from the perspective of the firm, division A’s 
resources are misallocated in favor of its own activities, away from supporting the activities of 
division B.  This is because as division A’s share (Π
A / Π) rises its bargaining power increases.  The 
misallocation of resources from the perspective of the firm fulfills the division-focused objective of 
increasing its rent-appropriation ability in stage 2 of the game. 
Typically, we would expect (5) hold through division A using its resources in its own operations 
to the extent of driving its own marginal profit towards zero (Π
A
1 → 0), while holding back 
resources from the operations of the other division (Π
B
2 > 0).  Thus, the quest for power causes 
division A (and symmetrically, division B) to increase profits from its own operations at the expense 
of overall firm profits.  It does this by withholding resources from the other division even though 
the marginal profit there is greater. 
It is important to note that in such cases, headquarters is unable to design incentive contracts to 
motivate divisional managers to act in the interests of the firm as a whole.  This would be the case 
in very large firms where the contribution of individual divisions to overall firm performance is 
difficult to quantify, i.e., computing the value of Π
B
2 may not be easy.  More importantly, the 
computation of the returns to inter-divisional cooperation it is subject to problems of incentive 
compatibility, i.e., division A has an incentive to overstate and division B has an incentive to 
understate this value. 
  A measure of power with particularly good properties that falls in this category is the 
division’s contribution to the Herfindahl index (Encaoua and Jacquemin, 1980).  In this case, α = f 
(Π
A / Π) = (Π
A / Π)
2. Note that the contribution to the Herfindahl index is quadratic and generates a 
convex power function.  Inserting this contribution into (4) yields 
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which can be simplified to 
 
(6)  ∂PA









A] = 0 
 
It may be clearly seen that there exist values Π
A
1 < 0 and Π
B
2 > 0 that are sufficient for this to hold.  
In this case, power increases so rapidly in profit share, that division A actually accepts lower profits 
from its own operations if it can reduce division B’s profits by a greater amount through resource 
withholding.  Thus, division A optimizes by attempting to gain a larger share of a smaller overall 




2 > 0) into (6) ensures that 
∂PA
*/∂EA > 0.  The firm’s overall optimum resource involves division A using less of its resources 
on its own operations. 
                                                 
3 We are implicitly assuming that the both divisions are profitable, i.e., Π
A > 0, Π
B > 0, so that Π > 0.  However, this is 
merely a simplifying assumption.  Since power is a function of relative profits, we could just as well shift the origin to 
the profits of the weakest division (the one with the lowest profits), so that relatively all other divisions would always 
have non-negative profits.   5
Another special case occurs where power is linearly dependent on profit share.  This implies 
that f ′ = k, where ‘k’ is a constant.  In this case, (4) reduces to Π
A
1 = 0. Thus, the division 
maximizes its own profit, and the effects of its actions on the other division do not enter into its 
decisions at all.  Since power and share are identical in this case, the two influences cancel out, 
ensuring that the division keeps whatever profit it generates from its own operations.  Hence, it 
focuses on maximizing returns from its own operations and any resources provided in support of the 
other division are excess or ‘leftover’ resources that it cannot use. It may be seen that in this 
particular case the division is pursuing autarky.  However, in order to implement this strategy of 
autarky, the division must create power and play the game against the other division.  Therefore, as 
noted above, autarky is a strategic outcome within the game and not an outside option. 
For completeness, we finally examine the case where the function f(.) is such that f ′ < 0.  In 




2 > 0. The marginal 
value of resource use in division A’s own activities is larger than the marginal value in the other 
division’s activities.  From the perspective of the firm, the division actually misallocates its 
resources in favor of the activities of the other division. This is because as division A’s share (Π
A/Π) 
rises its bargaining power falls.  Thus, it acts to reduce its share of total firm profit. The situations in 
which this could arise are doubtless quite rare.  An example of such a situation could be where 
headquarters is pre-disposed to equalizing contributions within the firm.  Thus, it may always ally 
itself with weaker divisions and the strength of its support may be contingent on the weakness of 
the division.  By reducing the disparity in divisional profits, a strong division could conceivably 
neutralize headquarters re-distributional efforts.
4 
 
3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we address an issue that has not received much attention in the classical theory of the 
firm, i.e., how does intra-firm bargaining affect the scope and organization of large multi-divisional 
firms?  Coase (1937) suggested that transactions that are typically conducted within the firm are not 
governed by the price mechanism, but rather by power relationships.  Questions about what has to 
be understood as power, its role and its sources have been investigated in the literature. Mechanisms 
such as ownership of physical assets (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), the 
allocation of control rights over the acquisition of information (Aghion and Tirole, 1997), the 
provision of access to critical resources (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) and the investment in direct 
specialization over time (Rajan and Zingales, 2001) have all been elements defining alternative 
concepts of internal power within the firm.  However, the role that power plays inside the business 
organization is poorly understood.  A number of papers model intra-firm multilateral bargaining 
processes between the top management and employees to demonstrate that the way in which 
contractual negotiations are organized might affect the overall governance structure of the firm 
(Stole and Zwiebel, 1996).  However, the focus in these studies has been concentrated on the 
employer-employee power relationship.  The interaction between divisions or subsidiaries in large 
business organizations and its effects on the performance of the firm as a whole has been largely 
neglected. 
In this paper we focus on the role played by divisional power in multi-divisional firms.  We 
claim that the extent of rent seeking and the consequent resource misallocation depend on the 
bargaining power enjoyed by each division in negotiating resource transfers within the firm with 
both the other competing divisions and the firm’s headquarters.  In this framework, resources tend 
to be appropriated by the more powerful divisions.  Divisional power is therefore merely a means to 
an end, which is represented by the ability to extract rents from the value created by the firm’s 
activities.  In our model we argued that the bargaining power enjoyed by the different divisions 
                                                 
4 Note again, that unlike the approach commonly adopted in the internal capital markets literature, headquarters does 
not exercise dictatorial power.    6
drives resource flows within the firm (i.e., the direction and level of rent appropriation).  However, 
we have not specified the nature and sources of divisional bargaining power in detail.  
In traditional organization theory, multi-divisional firms are seen as hierarchical organizations 
in which headquarters delegates divisions’ decision rights (Williamson, 1975).  The transfer of 
decision-making authority to divisions creates opportunities for the implementation of activities 
involving moral hazard.  In this context, headquarters must choose the optimal level of delegation 
such that misallocation of resources is reduced to a minimum (Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Gal-Or 
and Amit, 1998). In this approach to the theory of the firm divisions are seen as passive agents and 
headquarters have complete control over the amount decision rights to be delegated.  In this 
framework, the notion of discretion is generally used to indicate the extent to which divisions can 
exercise decision-making autonomy (Simon, 1991; Baker et al., 2001).  
In our model, the traditional view of the firm appears as a special case.  The novelty of our 
approach consists in introducing another source of divisional autonomy, in addition to the discretion 
that is granted by headquarters.  We refer to what has been defined in the previous section as 
divisional bargaining power (even vis’ a vis’ headquarters!).  In our theoretical model the 
bargaining power of a given division is a function of its profit share.  This power can be either 
exogenously or endogenously generated depending on the nature of the bargaining power function 
f(.).  It is straightforward to note that the case of exogenously determined divisional bargaining 
power (f ′= 0) is analogous to the notion of discretion.  In this case, the firm-focused objective 
dominates the division-focused objective because either headquarters is too powerful or the division 
is too weak. The traditional view of the firm as a hierarchical governance structure applies and the 
role played by the division in extracting rents from intra-firm resource transfers is negligible if it 
exists at all. 
Divisional bargaining power is endogenously determined (f ′≠ 0) when a set of divisional 
resources, actions and/or characteristics affect its productivity.  We refer to those resources, actions 
and characteristics that create informational and other competitive advantages and affect the 
strategic independence of a given division with respect to other divisions and the firm as a whole 
(Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  In particular, we allude a division’s strategic 
position within the firm as evidenced by the extent of tasks performed in the firm’s supply chain, 
the control exercised over the production process, the duration of the division’s operations within 
the firm, its research and development (R&D) intensity and the extent of its knowledge creating 
capabilities (Mudambi and Navarra, 2002a and 2002b).  The division’s strategic position affects its 
competitive advantage in negotiating resource transfers within the firm. 
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) point out that financial diversity amongst divisions 
reduces the incentive of the better performing divisions to cooperate with the poorer performing 
divisions, since the returns to cooperation are likely to fall between those of the two.  They argue 
that headquarters reduces intra-firm financial diversity in order to strengthen the incentives for 
divisions to cooperate.  We suggest that this only tells part of the story;  Divisions that are powerful 
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